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INTRODUCTION 
The scope of this paper is to provide an illustration of how social co-operatives can 
consistently pursue their social mission whilst retaining economic sustainability. We rely on 
case study analysis of an Italian social co-operative. Since 1991 social co-operatives have 
been conceived in the Italian legislation as mutual-benefit entrepreneurial organisations with 
a social character. The social objective was nested into the mutualistic structure, while the 
multi-stakeholder governance and the accumulation of socialized assets made the social co-
operative similar to more traditional non-profit forms.  
Our study was conducted at CEFF (Educational Co-operative for the Faenza Families), an 
organisation that comprises two social co-operatives located in Faenza, (Emilia-Romagna, 
Italy), offering both employability services and labour integration for the disadvantaged. 
CEFF is a suitable case to contribute to an understanding of the emergence, sustainability and 
resilience of the co-operative business model. First, we offer an analysis of the structure and 
development of governance at CEFF, as an illustration of the emergence of a multi-
stakeholder co-operative. Second, by analysing its evolution over time, we aim at shedding 
new light on the social nature of cooperation within a competitive market economy, on the 
ways in which co-operatives can generate and distribute social value across an integrated 
(horizontal) value chain by means of networking. 
In the conceptual scheme proposed by Mazzarol et al. (2011), co-operative firms are 
characterized as productive units with a dual role: the satisfaction of the objectives of 
members as owners, and the satisfaction of members as patrons. While the first objective is 
dominant in investor-owned and profit-maximizing companies, the second objective is 
dominant in co-operatives as associative organisational forms (Birchall 2010). 
Complementarily, we recognize another relevant dimension, the satisfaction of emerging 
needs across the community where the co-operative is embedded. This extended dimension 
of mutuality appeals to the systemic role of co-operatives, which is characterized by feedback 
mechanisms with the surrounding environment, for example in terms of production and 
accumulation of social capital, as well as pursuit of socially relevant objectives. 
Some typologies of co-operatives, such as social co-operatives, have shaped their raison 
d’être around socially oriented activities. In most cases, they did so: (i) by limiting the 
distribution of profits,1 (ii) by introducing an explicit social goal in the definition of their 
activities, and (iii) by implementing multi-stakeholder governance. These institutional 
solutions are functional (i) to gather common resources which can be dedicated to the pursuit 
of social purposes, and (ii) to the involvement of those publics which bear relevant economic 
and social interests in the firm’s activity. 
The making of a more complex governance structure is likely to engender higher 
ownership costs with respect to the more conventional mono-stakeholder governance 
(Hansmann 1996; Borzaga and Tortia 2010). However, larger costs need to be compared with 
increased social benefit. In this respect, socially oriented co-operatives can be considered a 
third typology of co-operative firm, besides the two more traditional supply and demand side 
co-operatives, which historically emerged earlier.2 The initial examples of social co-
operatives emerged in Italy in the late 1970s. Their origin is connected with initiatives taken 
by social activists. These initiatives were directed to supplement public intervention in the 
delivery of social and community services.3 
Social co-operatives were conceived by their founders, right from the start, as mutual-
benefit entrepreneurial organisations with a social character. The social objective was nested 
into the mutualistic structure, while the accumulation of socialized assets made social co-
operative similar to more traditional non-profit forms. Borzaga and Ianes (2006) describe 
these early social co-operatives as “social-solidarity co-operatives”. These firms overcame 
the strict mutual benefit objective of more traditional typologies of co-operatives, such as 
worker, producer, and consumer co-operatives. 
Because of their anomalies, socially oriented co-operatives were initially rejected by the 
Italian jurisprudence on the ground that they did not fulfil the requirements of internal 
mutuality. The concept of “enlarged” or “external” mutuality was introduced later, to 
safeguard the social objective of the new typology of co-operatives. The de facto acceptance 
of co-operatives pursuing social objectives paved the way for a new legislative act in 1991 
that regulated “social co-operatives” as a new juridical category (ibid.). In 2005 there were 
about 10,000 active organisations at the national level (ISTAT 2008), distinguished between 
Type A and Type B social co-operatives.4 
To account for the extended-mutuality dimension of co-operatives, we develop a 
theoretical synthesis of multi-stakeholder governance in the non-profit sector, which we then 
use to interpret the case of CEFF (Emilia-Romagna, Italy), a system of two interconnected 
co-operatives that offers employability services to local families and labour integration for 
the disadvantaged. The CEFF case was undertaken in 2006 and can usefully contribute to an 
understanding of how specific social needs have been progressively integrated into the aims 
and governance of the organisation yet ensuring the sustainability and resilience of the co-
operative business model. 
With the aim of appreciating the evolution of a multi-stakeholder model, this case study 
was designed to include a variety of voices and implemented through a series of in depth 
interviews. These involved (i) two managers in the areas of research and development and 
human resources management; (ii) the directors of the two co-operatives; (iii) the president of 
one of the co-operatives (CEFF Bandini); (iv) two disadvantaged (former. drug-addicted) 
workers; (v) volunteer social workers. The interviews have evidenced the existence of robust 
and multi-dimensional linkages between the organisation, its members, and the local publics. 
Ties generate feedback mechanisms that contribute to community development through the 
accumulation of local social capital and the building of inclusive socio-economic systems 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2007; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2011); finally, also through the reduction 
of negative social effects and social costs deriving from marginalization. The CEFF case 
sheds light on concrete ways in which co-operatives can generate and distribute social value 
building on shared beliefs and objectives, social ties, inclusive governance and consistent 
management practices. 
Following the introduction, in the first section we offer a general framework aimed at 
justifying the shift from the traditional mono-stakeholder focus to multi-stakeholder 
governance in the supply of welfare and social services. The second section discusses the 
main emerging properties of multi-stakeholder governance: its ability to internalize crucial 
contractual effects and to reduce contractual and social costs, to support the production of 
social value, and to develop networking, both inside and outside the organisation. The third 
section focuses on the CEFF system and explains the interconnections between the evolution 
of local social needs and CEFF’s governance structure. The fourth section concludes. 
 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CO-OPERATIVES AS A SPECIAL CASE OF 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ORGANISATIONS 
The vast literature on the existence of market failures has extensively dealt with market 
imperfections and the remedies for them. For example, the literature on agency costs 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972) and on the separation between ownership and control (Berle and 
Means 1932) evidenced long ago the existence of inefficiencies in the standard principal-
agent contractual structure. In this literature, the presence of asymmetric information and 
diverging interests always generates agency costs, and optimal incentive structures were 
developed to address the insurgence of such costs. Despite the wide observation of failures of 
such kind, conventional economic theories (neoclassical and the new-institutionalist) 
understand market imperfections more as exceptions to the smooth functioning of 
competitive markets than as the rule. 
This is evident in sectors populated by non-profit oriented organisations, where 
contractual imperfections are an intrinsic feature of the activities and may not be overcome 
by traditional organisational forms, such as the for-profit firm and the public sector 
organisation (Weisbrod 1977, 1988; Hansmann 1996). As in Kreps (1990), multi-stakeholder 
corporate culture can emerge within the organisational boundaries to supplement the 
deficiencies of contractual structures. Such processes of internalization and involvement can 
slow down the process of governance and increase its costs. However, when contractual 
failures are serious, the costs of market contracting can grow exponentially as well, and 
active involvement of different stakeholders may be the only modality by which production 
can take place in a cost-effective way. 
The correction of failures within the standard framework of competing profit-seeking 
entities appears difficult in many instances because of the dominance of the profit orientation 
and the intractability and cost inflating connotation of contractual imperfections. However, 
the literature on corporate social responsibility has highlighted various channels through 
which profit seeking firms can achieve a better social standing (Degli Antoni and Sacconi 
2011; Sacconi 2011). Here, self-regulation in terms of ethical codes and social accounting is 
understood as an institutional feature that can support socially responsible behaviours. Still, 
in profit seeking firms the profit objective and decision making power appear to be strongly 
concentrated in the hands of investors and, consequently, contractual protection accorded to 
non-investor groups of patrons appear, as a norm, weak. Asymmetric information and ex-post 
contractual opportunism can still impose significant costs even after accounting for corporate 
social responsibility criteria. 
 A critical perspective on the limits of conventional corrective mechanisms to market 
failure raises an opportunity for enquiring about the characteristics of multi-stakeholder 
governance. Theory suggests that multi-stakeholder governance requires the achievement of 
cooperation among groups of patrons. Results in the field of game theory, experimental 
economics, and field research show that the co-operative outcome is, in general, the best 
possible result for all the involved constituencies. However, in order for it to be achieved, 
rules need to be put in place that allow co-operative and reciprocating behaviours to emerge 
and be sustained overtime (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Ostrom 2005; Sacchetti and Tortia 2012). 
In the absence of proper working rules the co-operative outcome is not likely to be 
accomplished because of the impinging risk of exclusively self-seeking behaviours by some 
individuals or groups, and because of the absence of mechanisms for punishing defections. 
Indeed, one of the main functions of organisational routines, beyond imposing sanctions on 
non-co-operative behaviours, is the stabilization of expectations about the behaviour of others 
(Nelson and Winter 1982; Hodgson 1993, 2006). 
The diffusion of social co-operatives in Italy supports the idea that, at least in some sectors 
(e.g. in the production of non-traditional and non-standardized goods and services), and for 
some organisational forms more than for others (e.g. mutual and social benefit organisations 
more than profit seeking companies), multi-stakeholder organisations are sustainable. Their 
diffusion appears closely connected with the specific features of their governance structure. 
In particular, we suggest that the exclusion of the profit motive and investors’ control creates 
space for the inclusion of groups of non-investor stakeholders in the active governance of the 
organisation. 
In contrast, for-profit firms appear to be characterized by a more rigid, exclusive and 
hierarchical form of governance in which the inclusion of non-investor stakeholders is more 
severely limited. In this case, contrasting interests between investor and non-investor 
stakeholders seem more prone to emerge as a consequence of the focus on financial 
objectives, and as a result of the exclusion of non-investor stakeholders. 
Comparatively, multi-stakeholder co-operatives do not appear to be directed to maximize 
conventional efficiency, financial objectives or, more generally, exclusive interests as in for-
profit firms, but to create an inclusive form of governance that is able to overcome the severe 
contractual failures that afflict the private provision of social services, (e.g. asymmetric 
information, uneven distribution of decision making power, divergent objectives of different 
stakeholders). 
In these respects, multi-stakeholder co-operatives appear better suited than profit 
maximizing ones to serve the interest of the community and of society at large since they are 
able to internalize a wider variety of motivations and interests and, through appropriate 
deliberation, achieve a synthesis that aims at accomplishing a shared understanding of what 
the needs are and how these can be met (Ben-Ner and Gui 1993; Ben-Ner and Van-
Hoomissen 1993; Sacchetti and Sugden 2011). Finally, in addition to the social orientation, 
multifaceted membership suits the individual’s intrinsic desire for variety and discovery, 
increasing the entrepreneurial content of the activity by means of active involvement in 
communication and deliberation (Bianchi 1998; Kirzner 1989; Sacchetti 2012b). 
 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CO-OPERATIVES AND THE PRODUCTION 
OF SOCIAL VALUE 
The co-operative firm, which has historically emerged as a mono-stakeholder business form, 
appears consistent with multi-stakeholdership, more than investor-owned companies. While 
in the latter the dominance of the profit motivation and of control by exclusive interests (i.e. 
investors) can at best be constrained by public or self-regulation,5 co-operatives represent, 
right from the start, a business form controlled by a non-exclusive and non-investor 
stakeholder membership. In co-operatives, in fact, the dominance of investor ownership is 
overcome even when they are monostakeholder organisations, whilst the extension of active 
involvement to more than one group of non-investor patrons can represent a natural step 
forward, when this is required by the effectiveness of entrepreneurial action that is explicitly 
aimed at the fulfilment of social needs. 
In Italy, the historical development of social co-operatives supports the view that while 
many were created as mono-stakeholder organisations, most social co-operatives grew as 
multi-stakeholder ventures. The scope was to include different constituencies in the 
governance structure in order to effectively achieve social objectives (ISTAT 2008; Borzaga 
and Ianes 2006). The Italian law on social co-operatives (law 381/1991) explicitly recognises 
the possibility, but not the necessity, that different groups of social actors are included into 
the formal governance of the organisation (members’ assembly, boards of directors, advisory 
and auditing boards). The law also disposes that social co-operatives cannot be controlled 
bodies. Multi-stakeholder governance was explicitly introduced: (i) to account for the need of 
active participation demanded by different groups of patrons; (ii) to institutionally underpin 
the entrepreneurial nature of these mutual-benefit ventures; (iii) to overcome contractual 
failures traditionally encountered in the supply of social services; (iv) to give a tangible form 
to the concern for the community that was then taken up by the 7th ICA principle. 
The implications of the policy can be clarified perhaps by reflecting on the main socio-
economic features that multi-stakeholder governance is expected to add to traditional forms 
of governance. In our understanding these are: 
<nl> 
1. the internalization of contractual effects and the improvement of welfare for the 
involved stakeholders; 
2. the implementation of inclusive processes of deliberation, implying a recognition of 
multiple perspectives and experiences, as well as the development and use of relevant 
knowledge; 
3. the production and distribution of a social surplus; 
4. the dynamic implementation of an inclusive growth process by means of networking. 
 
Internalization of External Contractual Effects and Inclusive Processes 
The internalization of external contractual effects into the objective function of the 
organisation passes through the gathering and elaboration of complex information, which can 
have a relevant and non-codifiable tacit dimension (Polanyi 1958, 1967). By promoting 
deliberative processes and communication, multi-stakeholder governance is expected to be 
able to reconcile the different, and in some cases diverging, objectives of individual groups of 
patrons. These effects are connected with the overcoming of simple contractual constraints 
connecting the organisation with non-controlling stakeholders, as well as with the 
establishment of a learning culture that favours values of enquiry and social inclusion. 
Inclusive deliberative processes have been specifically advocated because of their potential to 
activate individual creativity and to generate new knowledge about social needs and 
organisational processes across stakeholders (Sacchetti and Sugden 2011). 
Deliberative and inclusive processes are also expected to activate positive psychological 
effects. In particular they have been associated with the satisfaction of basic psychological 
needs such as competence (the mastering of abilities such as learning and creativity), 
autonomy (the feeling that an act is connected to the individual’s will and critical judgement) 
and relatedness (the feeling of belonging or being connected to a group) (Deci and Ryan 
2000). Taken together, these aspects of involvement have been associated with implications 
for individual welfare, in terms of health (Erdal 2011), satisfaction and firm performance 
(Lawler, 1986; Arthur, 1994; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Guest, 2011; Wood & Wall, 2007, 
Sacchetti and Tortia 2012a). Moreover, because they reinforce trust and reciprocity, 
communication and deliberation have been associated with increased co-operative behaviour 
(Ostrom 1990). Besides improving the work environment and answering to specific 
psychological needs, by reducing contrasts, trust relations can also, in more general terms, 
decrease the costs of transactions.6 
It follows that inclusive governance and deliberative practices are expected to lead to the 
private provision of collective goods, such as better quality of life and improved knowledge, 
as well as to the overcoming of various contractual deficiencies. 
Simple contractual relations are often insufficient to achieve the same results, given their 
incompleteness, and their short term and exchange nature. Costs of contracts can increase 
even if diverging interests do not break out into open confrontation when the risk of 
manifestation of contrasts is sufficient to halt transactions ex-ante. It follows the need to 
design governance rules that anticipate and deal with such risks within the organisational 
boundaries (Sabatini et al. 2013).7 
The interconnectedness between implicit contracts that are tacit, non-formalized 
agreements between the workers and their employers, and trust relations is deep. Indeed, the 
existence of trust can be both an input and an output in organisational processes. That is, the 
existence of trust relations ex-ante favours the accomplishment of organisational processes 
through the implementation of implicit contracts while, at the same time, organisational 
processes in a participatory context can help to strengthen and create new trust relations, for 
example though reciprocating behaviours of an individual or collective kind.  
The internalization of the relevant contractual effects often represents the main channel 
through which social value is produced, thanks to the common cognitive frame created by 
organisational processes and to emergence of trust amongst actors. Such processes can also 
favour the endogenous accumulation of social capital in a way that is not achievable by 
market exchanges (Sabatini et al., 2013). Co-operative firms in general and social co-
operatives specifically, appear to be particularly suited to develop these organisational 
features, as their governance is based on members’ participation (Birchall 2010). 
 
The Production and Distribution of a Social Surplus 
The ability to point out what the relevant publics are and involve them as different groups of 
patrons, bringing in multiple objectives and values, can result in the production of a social 
surplus (both monetary and non-monetary) for the actors involved. Such an outcome cannot 
be taken for granted and requires coordination mechanisms (centred around communication, 
deliberation and control) that can support the articulation and evaluation of various 
perspectives and interests. We have mentioned that the outcomes of inclusive, deliberative 
processes can lead to specific welfare benefits, for example: improved quality of life, related 
to different aspects of the work environment; strengthening of social relations in the 
community; and improved quality of services (Deci and Ryan 2000; Erdal 2011). 
One further implication is that, as a result of inclusive preferences within the organisation 
and towards the community, prices can also be lower and under specific circumstances 
services can be offered without fees for the beneficiaries (Borzaga et al. 2010). Given the 
social objective of the organization, costs can be reduced and benefits increased for some 
patrons  as a result of good communication, trust and social capital. Lower prices can be 
attained also because the non-profit and social orientation of multi-stakeholder co-operatives 
helps gather non-market resources, such as partial or complete work donations (partially non 
paid or volunteer work), and other typologies of donations. Donations correspond to cost and 
price reductions, and to increased supply of services, hence to increased social surplus. 
Furthermore, the constraints imposed on profit distribution support the accumulation of funds 
that can then be used for social, instead of private, purposes (Borzaga et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, not all benefits reach every group in the same way, since each effect is expected 
to benefit mainly the patrons that actively participate in the venture. For example, improved 
working conditions are conditional to the inclusion and active participation of employees in 
deliberative processes regarding organisational issues and objectives (Erdal 2011). 
In general, multi-stakeholder organisations show the potential to produce a social surplus 
that goes beyond the simple sum of the parts, attributable to individual groups of patrons. 
Collective action, coordination, the evolving network of relations, and the emergence of 
publics can help improve social welfare beyond the objectives of individuals or specific 
groups. For example, by employing disadvantaged workers, social co-operatives aimed at 
work integration have been able to reduce social costs, to decrease unemployment, and 
contribute to production. This may be possible only through the involvement of different 
groups of patrons, i.e. volunteers, social activists, disadvantaged workers and their families, 
and meso-level associations (e.g.  business associations and associations of the families of 
disadvantages workers). These groups have been involved following a process of social 
interaction that has uncovered their needs, as well as the ways in which the organisation 
could contribute to their satisfaction. At a more fundamental level, such welfare outcomes 
require, as a precondition, overcoming profit as the main objective, which pairs the 
emergence of inclusive governance structures pursuing articulated social needs and 
objectives. 
 
Networks 
The idea of multi-stakeholder organisation can be broadened by understanding the 
organisation as a network of co-interested and co-motivated actors (Sacchetti and Tortia 
2008). Indeed, the evolution of the organisation is favoured by the social ties of actors that 
have an active role in it (Granovetter 1983). At the same time, linkages evolve together with 
the organisation. The idea is that interconnections, like the body of knowledge and 
experience that they carry, are constantly incomplete. Being a privileged terrain for inclusive 
deliberative processes, multi-stakeholdership offers a favourable environment for the 
discovery of new interested publics and for constructing new relations. These patterns can 
take place inside the organization, but also with actors that lye outside the organizational 
boundaries (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012). In cooperative firms, this development pattern finds 
its preconditions in the inclusive nature of governance and its reliance on trust relations and 
social capital. 
Openness to emerging interests implies also their harmonization. This process requires 
that actors are driven by social preferences towards inclusion, resulting in patterns of 
interaction based on the search of publics and their involvement (Sacchetti and Sugden 2011; 
Sacchetti 2012a), but also on reciprocating behaviours and social goals (Sacconi 2011; Ben-
Ner and Putterman 1999). Here mutuality is understood as a typology of social relations 
based on communicative rationality, trust and reciprocity rather than direction (Sacchetti and 
Sugden 2003; Zamagni 2012). Mutuality is also expected to reinforce these processes and 
generate inclusion. In this sense, the values underpinning the internal governance of social 
co-operatives appear highly coherent with networks based on mutual relations also outside 
the boundaries of the organisation (Sacchetti and Tortia 2012b). 
 
THE CEFF SYSTEM IN FAENZA, CENTRAL ITALY 
The CEFF system (Educational Co-operative for the Faenza Families) exemplifies many of 
the governance issues that we have discussed. The CEFF system is now constituted by one 
Type A and one Type B co-operative, but when founded, in the seventies, the original co-
operative was one, with the main aim of offering educational and recreational services for 
local families in Faenza (Emilia-Romagna, Italy). Specifically, CEFF organised family 
holidays on the nearby Adriatic coast using a number of council “vacation houses.” Later, 
after these houses were closed, in 1977 CEFF was transformed and renamed CEFF Francesco 
Bandini after the name of its founder, who was at that time a volunteer in the movement 
Catholic Action, and later was elected as a Council member with the Christian Democrats. 
The new CEFF Bandini was intended to support families in a different way, i.e. by 
supplementing the Council’s employability services for disabled persons. CEFF became a 
“social-solidarity co-operative” (Borzaga and Ianes, 2006). The long process through which 
the organisational structure developed was completed in 1998 with the creation of CEFF 
Servizi, which represented the incorporation of the protected workshops already existing 
since the 1980s at CEFF Bandini. CEFF Servizi was created as spin-off of CEFF Bandini and 
constituted as a Type B work-integration social co-operative. CEFF Servizi employs some 
tens of disadvantaged workers, mostly disabled, but also a significant number of ex-drug 
addicts. 
Nowadays, the two organisations represent a highly integrated system, though they also 
acquired over time a degree of independence. CEFF Bandini delivers social services beyond 
the assistance that is required by disadvantaged workers at CEFF Servizi, while CEFF Servizi 
developed into a manufacturer producing intermediate goods for local client firms. In 2008 
the two CEFF co-operatives employed 122 ordinary worker members, 32 voluntary workers, 
24 standard employees (non-members), 40 workers with employability difficulties 
(differentiated into active employees, and ex-employees reintegrated in the labour market). In 
total, about 250 workers are involved in the activities of the system. In 2004 the turnover of 
CEFF Bandini was €1,071 million Euros, corresponding to a total net value added of 
€587,000. CEFF Servizi had in the same year a turnover of €966,000, which corresponded to 
a net value added of €497,000. 
Over the years, CEFF has responded organically to the needs of its multiple stakeholders 
by dividing into two democratically governed subsystems. Crucially, by distributing 
substantial control powers to stakeholders, CEFF has prepared the social mission for other 
aims. Started by a group of volunteers, over time it came to include in its governance a 
variegated set of different patrons (employees, the parent association of the disabled workers, 
non-profit organisations that assist disadvantaged workers and families also outside of the 
working environment, the local business association, and the job centre). The ultimate change 
in CEFF’s rules, near the time the interviews were carried out in 2006, concerned the 
inclusion of workers as patrons of the organisation. This required the extension of 
membership rights to both ordinary employees and disadvantaged workers. This modification 
of the governance came late, almost 30 years after the starting experiences, because CEFF 
Bandini was born as an organisation controlled by volunteer workers, by associations dealing 
with the social reintegration of disadvantaged people, and by their parents. However, 
eventually the need was felt to take further steps in the direction of considering workers as 
active and involved stakeholders. This choice can be interpreted as being supported by 
efficiency reasons as worker involvement has been shown to be conducive to better service 
quality and firm performance (Lawler, 1986; Arthur, 1994; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Guest, 
2011; Wood & Wall, 2007, Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012a). 
The choice of governance as well as the pronounced social orientation was supported by 
the pre-existing network of strong social relations in the territory of Faenza, both within and 
outside public sector institutions. This evidence clearly supports classical theories explaining 
the relation between social capital and socio-economic development (Putnam et al. 1993). We 
can add, moreover, that CEFF seems to have contributed, over time, to strengthening social 
cohesion in the municipality, reinforcing a process of cumulative causation in which 
democratically governed social enterprises constitute not only users, but also producers of 
local social capital (Borzaga and Tortia 2009). A snapshot of this process of development 
does indeed identify substantial linkages between actors of the network and the internal 
governance of the CEFF co-operatives. CEFF Bandini developed as an open social system in 
which the solutions to the stimuli coming from the external social environment have been 
accommodated over the years. Our field work did not evidence the dominance of the 
objectives of specific groups of patrons over others and few, if any frictions amongst 
different constituencies were recorded over the years. The social mission was constantly 
assessed and updated (the move from recreational activities to social services, then adding 
work integration) and taken as the yardstick against which to evaluate decisions (such as the 
inclusion of a variety of publics over the years). These results have been supported by the: 
 
1. Values laid down by the founders of CEFF; 
2. Working rules of the organisations: e.g. in terms of regulating turnover in presidential 
and managerial positions; in the formal and informal processes of consultation and 
deliberation with other members; in the transparency and formalization of procedures put 
in place to promote personal development and provide a career path to individual users; 
3. Emergence and choice of managers who understand and share the social values of the 
organisation; 
4. The wise and attentive development of multi-stakeholder governance; 
5. Contribution and control exerted by volunteers, who also happen to have a public 
sector background; 
6. Centrality of local social capital.</nl> 
 
In particular, the different forms of participation that came to characterize the CEFF system 
have been gradually nested over the initial core created by volunteers and social activists. 
Connections with different associations and with the social service department in the 
municipality were sought for and developed over time. Also, discussions about the possibility 
and opportunity to allow all workers, and especially the disadvantaged ones into the 
membership have been going on for several years and, as a result, all workers who have 
open-hand labour contracts and wish to become members can now do so. Similarly, a 
prolonged process leads to the introduction of a new quality system for recruitment. The 
crucial feature of this quality system was eventually recognized in the screening of applicants 
based on the degree of intrinsic and social motivations, more than on educational attainments 
and previous work experience. In the Italian environment CEFF has been able to innovate 
and to shift from the standard focus that is based on productivity to a different focus based on 
pro-social values and motivations. This solution is clearly in line with other results 
concerning the recruitment of workers in non-profit organisations (Handy and Katz 1998). 
The inclusion of new publics and the design of tailored forms of participation, both in the 
governance of the organisations, and in managerial models, did not appear to have 
endangered, but instead to have empowered the operational abilities of the organisation. New 
organisational processes based on involvement helped to clarify and pursue the social mission 
as they contributed to build a relevant patrimony of non-codified knowledge and trust. Many 
of the processes within the organisational boundaries would have proven to be unmanageable 
on a contractual basis. For example, the services and advice offered by the associations 
actively involved in the governance could not have been exchanged through arm’s-length 
relations on the market. 
As for the dynamic features of the development of the CEFF system, the evidence shows 
that decision makers were able to strike an effective balance between the need to innovate 
and foster change in the way the organisation was governed, and the risks posed by such 
change in the presence of delicate (though not necessarily unstable) organisational equilibria. 
This balance was just struck by adding time and effort to the search for adequate solutions. 
As it appears, additional governance costs resulted in a more than proportional growth in 
social benefits. 
Also, the features of the involvement processes at CEFF make clear that a high degree of 
participation necessitates, as a precondition, a high degree of managerial independence in 
decision making. This independence was granted to hired professionals who have been in 
charge of setting up the most crucial regulatory codes, and of implementing the most delicate 
decisions. One reason for granting a high degree of independence to decision makers appears 
connected with the complexity of organisational problems. A second reason is to be found in 
the heterogeneity of the interests and motivations characterizing different constituencies. For 
example, the primary objective of business associations lies in trying to secure an adequate 
level of productivity and work efficacy by disadvantaged workers. On the other hand, the 
charitable organisations sheltering many disadvantaged workers demand their reintegration in 
the social context. Managerial independence and discretion has the function of maintaining 
equilibrium between competing ends. This is coherent with a perspective in which the 
managerial function is not one of pursuing exclusively or predominantly the maximization of 
economic returns, but much more one of designing and guaranteeing the accomplishment of 
appropriate organisational equilibria (Blair and Stout 1999). The message supported by the 
CEFF experience is that the managerial function in socially oriented organisations is strictly 
connected with the ability to seek and guarantee active participation and, at the same time, 
with the capacity to accomplish effective decisions. 
Our fieldwork also supports the view that economic aggregates such as costs, turnover, 
and net residuals work as parameters for assessing the economic sustainability of the 
organisation. They are not the objectives of the organisation (Borzaga and Tortia 2010). 
Rather, they are instrumental to the accomplishment of desired objectives. Indeed throughout 
the history of CEFF, their relevance, though not concealable, appeared quite limited when 
compared with the matters arising from the complex system of interconnections between the 
organisation and the surrounding environment which has shaped the CEFF system. 
 
Latest Developments: The CEFF System in the Midst of the Economic Crisis 
Starting from 2007 the economic crisis hit the whole Italian economy, whose GDP shrank by 
5% in 2009 and shrank again by 2.1% in 2012. The unemployment rate grew to  10.7% in 
2012, peaking at 12.2% in August 2013. Youth unemployment reached the astonishing figure 
of 40.1% in July 2013, while the NEET (the young Not in Education, Employment or 
Training) reached 23% in the same period (IMF and ISTAT data).8 The local economy in 
Faenza has not been exception and all actors, both private and public, have been forced to 
look for ways of escaping the worst consequences of the crisis. Throughout these difficult 
years the CEFF system has shown admirable stability and resilience, even if difficulties are 
being encountered and counteracting maneuvers have been activated. Overall, the system 
kept on relying on both public procurement contracts, and on sales to the private sector. 
About half of the turnover has been stably obtained from public procurement for the delivery 
of socio-assistance and health services (about 25%) and from other deliveries of goods and 
services to the public sector (about 25%). The remaining half of the turnover is obtained (as 
before the crisis) from sales of goods and services to private actors. 
The two components (public and private) show, however, different dynamics. Sales on the 
private markets witnessed growing instability and forced the CEFF system to look for new 
and more promising alternatives to the traditional delivery channels. On the other hand, 
public procurement bids and other contracts with the public sector showed a slow but 
inexorable decline. This is strictly connected with the severe crisis of Italian public finance. 
Quite clearly, social co-operatives are being used as a way to externalize and reduce public 
expenditure, imposing on them shrinking margins and cuts in labour costs. Overall, while the 
instability of the market is causing concern, the private channel appears to be most promising 
direction for the development of the CEFF system. 
With this prospect, new sectors of activity have been envisaged and are being developed, 
mainly: the production of organic goods in the agri-food processing sector, the development 
of fair trade channels, and the production of environmental products and waste management 
(for example the installation of photovoltaic panels). Moreover, to face the crisis on the 
private market the CEFF system has endeavoured to strengthen network ties in the search for 
more effective solutions to economic and financial problems. In particular CEFF has fostered 
networking aimed at implementing partnerships with the public sector for the reintegration of 
disadvantaged people, and community level networks aimed at local development initiatives. 
Looking more closely at the evolution of accounting figures, occupational levels at CEFF 
have been stable throughout the crisis, even in the presence of slightly shrinking revenues and 
strongly shrinking positive residuals (profits). The granting of employment stability to the 
whole workforce has been an explicit choice, which was pursued even to the detriment of 
profitability and, potentially, new investment plans. This evidence confirms the general 
tendency of co-operative firms to grant “employment insurance” to their workforce more than 
profit making enterprises (Miyazaki and Neary 1983). In negative economic contingencies 
this preference is pursued in conjunction with a preference for “income insurance” to the 
detriment of profitability (Navarra 2010; Albanese et al. 2012). At the same time, investments 
levels are stalled. Projects have been programmed, but are kept on hold due to the contextual 
uncertainty, but also as a reflection of the constraints that social organisations encounter with 
respect to financial mechanisms. While these organisations appear stable and less risky than 
other entrepreneurial forms, their ability to gather finance on the market is often more 
constrained than in the case of commercial companies since financial intermediaries tend to 
see in social businesses a low degree of financial reliability. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The CEFF case corroborated and clarified many of the organisational issues that were taken 
up and discussed in the first part of the chapter. The pro-social nature of the organisation and 
multi-stakeholder governance effectively dealt with the emergence of multiple interests and 
their reconciliation into the mission of the organisation, which was instituted and transformed 
over time as social objectives and principal aims developed. The advantages of multi-
stakeholder governance, as highlighted above, appear to be accomplished since, in the first 
stance, CEFF was able to overcome severe contractual failures (in terms of asymmetric 
information and diverging interests). This has happened, for example, through the 
involvement of disadvantaged workers on the one hand, and of employers’ associations on 
the other. 
Yet, multi-stakeholdership has proven to be able to do more than just overcome 
contractual failures. Participation and other inclusive practices have created and strengthened 
trust, which has greatly reduced potential and actual conflict. Participation has also favoured 
the creation of novel knowledge, specific to the effective delivery of social services. Crucial 
social effects connected with the exclusion of disadvantaged workers have been internalized 
and re-addressed, thus reducing social costs. By lowering the costs of exclusion and 
heightening solidarity in favour of the weakest, CEFF succeeded in increasing the welfare of 
many families in Faenza and of the community as a whole. The production of social value by 
this kind of organisation is so pronounced as to be interpretable in terms of private production 
of local public goods. Also, inclusion has not compromised the effective and efficient 
delivery of services and production of goods. The CEFF system achieved remarkable 
standing in production efficiency, and in product and service quality, as exemplified by the 
subcontracting arrangements with a number of client firms in Faenza. Amongst social co-
operatives, CEFF has undoubtedly reached a level of excellence in terms of its ability to 
rescue difficult social situations through the accumulation of productive skills. Finally, 
networking has been crucial in the development of the governance structure, both internally 
in terms of relations amongst directly participating stakeholders, and externally across the 
community and the different publics. 
The long wave that led to the emergence of this multi-stakeholder social co-operative 
appears as a process led by forerunners in social development. Some of its features and 
results can prove to be useful to all new and emerging models of socially oriented businesses, 
but also to more traditional organisations, as an example of inclusive and sustainable 
strategies. The aims and process established at CEFF have not, so far, been halted by the 
economic crisis that hit the Italian economy over the last few years. In this respect, the CEFF 
system has shown remarkable stability and resilience in terms of activity levels and 
employment, though the shrinking support by the public sector and the instability of the 
market has required innovative solutions, such as entering new sectors and strengthening 
network ties. 
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1
 The imposition of the non-profit distribution constraint can be either partial or total. It is, as a norm, total in 
non-profit organisations in all national legislations. In some countries, like Italy and Spain, co-operative firms 
are required to build indivisible reserves of capital out of retained (non-distributed) profits. All Italian co-
operatives are bound to reinvest at least 30% of their positive net residuals into indivisible reserves to be used 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exclusively for the development of their activities. Also, special banking legislation requires Italian co-operative 
credit banks (BCC) to reinvest in the same way at least 70% of their positive residuals. This high ratio is 
intended to guarantee the patrimonial strength of BCCs, and to favour the communitarian role of BCCs as 
require by Italian banking legislation and by the ICA 7th principle.  
2
 Initial examples of demand side co-operatives (such as consumer coops) go back to the Rochdale pioneers in 
the middle of the 19th century’s. Supply side co-operatives spread initially as worker or peasant co-operatives in 
France and Italy at the end of the 19th century. 
3
 Theories on the emergence of entrepreneurial non-profit organisations refer to the existence of State failures in 
the supply of public goods (Weisbrod, 1977, 1988), and to contract failures in the presence of pronounced 
asymmetric information between the supplying firm and uninformed customers (Hansmann, 1996). Socially 
oriented co-operatives appeared during the last decades of the 19th century, as a response to the welfare state 
crisis experienced in some European areas. In countries like Italy, the more and more stringent constraints 
undergone by public finance in the supply of welfare and social services resulted in the creation of private, non-
profit entrepreneurial organisations geared to produce such services. Social activism, which led these initial 
experiments, had also the function of instilling entrepreneurial spirit into the organized delivery of services.  
4
 In the Italian legislation (law 381/1991) there are two types of social co-operative. Type A delivers social 
services, mainly in child and elderly care, in health care, and in educational and recreational activities. Type B 
are instead production organisations directed to the reintegration of disadvantaged people in the labor market, 
where disadvantaged people must count for at least 30% of the total workforce (typically disabled persons, ex-
drug addicts, ex-offenders, the mentally ill, and long term unemployed). Most Type B operate as industrial 
companies producing intermediate or final goods and services which can also have a social relevance, for 
example environmentally friendly, green products and waste management. Substantial tax advantages are 
granted to all social cooperatives, but especially to the B Type in order for the State to recognize and support 
their social function and to allow their economic and financial viability. 
5
 A case in point in this respect is represented by new forms of socially oriented businesses such as the 
Community Interest Company (CIC) in the UK and by Social Enterprises (SE) in Italy, introduced by legislation 
respectively in 2005and 2006. They can take the form of co-operatives, but also of entrepreneurial nonprofits 
and of investor-owned businesses. In the latter case, they are controlled by investors, but undergo stringent 
constraints on the distribution of profits, which are intended to exclusively support the development of the 
organisation and to allow financial sustainability. Social enterprises need to include all the relevant stakeholders 
in the governance of the organisation. CICs and SEs clearly represent hybrid organisational forms characterised 
by non-traditional control rights, firm objectives and governance solutions.  
6
 Following the  new-institutionalist approach by Hansmann (1996), we can state that multi-stakeholder 
governance can be more efficient than mono-stakeholder governance when the costs undergone in writing 
contracts with the plurality of stakeholders are higher than the costs of organising production within a 
coordinated governance structure (cfr. also Borzaga, Depedri, and Tortia, 2011; Giudi, 2011) 
7
 We could still argue, however, that trust can also reduce the transaction costs connected with market 
exchanges. Still, implicit contracts are used to back relations within the organisational boundaries more than in 
market exchanges, and therefore trust is expected to play a greater role around relationships developed out of 
market transactions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 We are grateful to Massimo Caroli for further interviews conducted during summer and autumn 2012 
concerning the development of the CEFF system during the 2007 to 2012 period. 
